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CONSEQUENCES OF DISFRANCHISEMENT: RACE AND CLASS DISCRIMINATION IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1880-1910

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"The problem that the South now presents," asserted Walter Hines Page in an Atlantic Monthly article in 1902, "has at last become so plain that thoughtful men no longer differ about it. It is no longer obscured by race differences nor by political differences. It is simply the training of the untrained masses." Education, Page was sure, would build a new "democratic order of society" in the South, would, as he had asserted in a famous 1897 speech, "develop the forgotten man. . . . The neglected people will rise," he went on, "and with them will rise all the people."

What are we to make of Page's glorious hopes? Were they merely the pious pronouncements of a Progressive phrasemonger, or did his predictions reflect reality? There was, to be sure, a massive increase in Southern educational expenditures in the South during the so-called "Progressive Era." But how equitably were the funds distributed and what explains the pattern of distribution? Did the new monies go primarily to the "forgotten men and women," black and white, mainly to the upper and middle classes, or were they divided equally among all classes? Was the creed of the Southern educational crusade "equality of opportunity in the school for all, black and white," as the chief historian of the movement, Charles W. Dabney, put it? Or did the campaigns for education lead to greater inequality, to discrimination in the distribution of funds which was, in Louis Harlan's phrase, "almost universal, flagrant, and increasing?"[1] Moreover, how did elimination from the electorate of large numbers of lower-class whites, as well as practically all the blacks, effect the allocation of

educational funds? Were Progressive politicians and "educational statesmen" so committed to equality of opportunity that they not only extended schooling for the sons and daughters of participants in politics but also for the children of the disfranchised?[2] Or could public schooling be paid for only in the proper democratic currency -- the ballot? Furthermore, how did the curtailment of party competition effect the apportionment of educational services? Did the decline of partisan debate free educationists to pursue the rhetorically popular goal of better education for all, or at least for all whites? Or did one-party domination allow the Democratic party elite to ignore the claims on public services of the unorganized? Was politics, in Charles W. Dabney's words, "the curse of our public education system," the removal of which would, he presumed, lead to educational progress? Or, on the other hand, was V. O. Key correct in asserting that, at least "over the long run," "the have-nots lose" in a political system without organized parties? Finally, several political scientists, most notably Thomas R. Dye, have recently advanced a general economic and social determinist hypothesis to explain variations in such political "outputs" as public education. Simply stated, Dye's view is that the socioeconomic structure directly or indirectly determines the levels and perhaps the distribution (Dye is not so categorical on this point) of public services. Permutations of such characteristics of the political structure as turnout and party competition according to the dyed-in-the-wool proponents of this hypothesis, have no independent influence upon public policy.[4]

The paper I am presenting here today will summarize the first fruits of a very large quantitative study of education in the eleven ex-Confederate states from 1880 to 1910, a study addressed primarily to the rhetorical questions and hypotheses just outlined. Let me emphasize at the outset the tentativeness of my conclusions and underscore the incompleteness of the data analyzed to this point.

Although I had planned to present results here based on an analysis of several states, the task proved so massive -- the computer and I have been manipulating matrices containing about 15,000 separate correlation coefficients for one state alone -- that I was able to complete the analysis only for North Carolina. It was, of course, not by chance that I picked North Carolina to focus on first. The birthplace of Page, Dabney, and such other famous educational reformers as Edwin A. Alderman and Charles D. McIver, and the home of the foremost Southern Progressive "educational governor," Charles Brantley Aycock, North Carolina has also been perhaps the favorite state of Southern historians. Developments in education in North Carolina in the early 20th century were broadcast throughout the region and even the nation at the time, and have since been studied intensively by Edgar W. Knight and Charles W. Dabney, both of whose conclusions were revised by Louis R. Harlan.[5] Many other works of biography and political history also treat the evolution of education in North Carolina. North Carolinians also -- and this, to a climetrician, is perhaps the most important consideration -- kept the best educational statistics during this period. Consequently, although future analysis may prove the North Carolina data untypical of the South as a whole, the experience of that state will remain undeniably crucial to any interpretation of the politics of Southern education in the late 19th century and early 20th century.

Before scrutinizing the North Carolina educational statistics, however, let me explain more fully the hypotheses to be tested and briefly review the appropriate scholarly literature.

Two previously unconnected scholarly fields are relevant to the history of Southern education in this period: educational history and the public policy sub-field of political science. The first, educational history, was until lately a bastard offspring unacknowledged by either disciplinary relative. With the exceptions of the works of Horace Mann Bond in the thirties and Harlan in the fifties, Southern educational

histories of the Progressive period have been mostly inbred, in-house encomiums, charting the epic battles of lonely, enlightened educational knights-errant (usually state school superintendents) against the dark forces of the masses' ignorance, the politicians' greed, the conservatives' blind negativism. The educationists' successes were the triumphs of enlightened leadership, victories for "the people" by their betters. No selfish interest groups, no social coalitions, no class demands infested the crusaders' camp in these histories. More money for education was almost always better, no matter how it was distributed.

The typical narrative of the period from 1880 to 1910 in one of these histories, say, Knight on North Carolina, Heatwole or Buck on Virginia, or Orr on Georgia, would go something like this: Reconstruction produced a reaction against public education among most Southern whites. Resuscitated by noble, far-sighted superintendents, the educational systems struggled to survive against hostility and indifference for two and a half decades. Southern poverty and memories of the allegedly high taxes of Reconstruction kept school appropriations meager. The prosperity of the new century, the disfranchisement of the blacks -- which ended the possibility of a return to Reconstruction and thereby diminished the fear that taxes would be, in Southern Democratic eyes, misspent --, and the campaigns of a new generation of cosmopolitan, progressive leaders gave Southerners both the resources to finance education more adequately and the will to use them.[6]

If the standard ed. history monographs presented the view from the state superintendent's office, the critical works of Bond and Harlan scowled at the system from the one-room shack which served as a schoolhouse for black children. Bond's too often neglected 1934 book, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order, remains the essential starting point for any study of the politics of education in the postbellum South. Highlighting the white county vs.

black belt contests over the distribution of state education funds, Bond pictured blacks as little more than pawns in the battle, at least after the end of Reconstruction robbed them of what he termed "any real political power." Black belt whites in Mississippi and Alabama, Bond pointed out, managed to push through the legislature laws virtually inviting local school boards to discriminate racially in the allocation of funds. At the same time, legislators from heavily Negro counties preserved the system of distribution of state funds to counties and local school districts on the basis of the total school-age population of both races. The two sets of laws fostered educational inequality not only by race, but also, among whites, by geographical area. Whites in the black belt, Bond asserted on the basis of a rather cursory examination of the statistics for a few counties, prospered at the expense of both blacks and white county whites.

Bond's argument, a great deal of which was based chiefly on the single example of Alabama, rested on somewhat shaky factual grounds. Two decades later, Harlan buttressed Bond's general points with a study of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia from 1900 to 1915. Painstaking in his use of traditional literary sources, Harlan was as thorough in analyzing statistics as could be expected in the days before Fortran became a recognized foreign language in the profession. Largely on the basis of statewide statistics, data from a few extreme counties, and what is usually termed "eyeball correlation," Harlan concluded that racial inequality in educational services increased during the Progressive Era in the South, that in education, as in other segments of Southern life, Progressivism was, in C. Vann Woodward's phrase, "for whites only." Laying less stress than Bond had on the argument that black-county white gains came at the expense of white-county whites as well as blacks generally, Harlan did little more than Bond had to test that proposition systematically.[7]

The second scholarly field relevant to the politics of education is the investigation of so-called "policy outputs" in political science. As with so many other topics in that discipline, this subject begins with some remarks by the late V. O. Key. In his classic Southern Politics, Key argued that in order to assert their interests effectively on the state and local issues of taxation and expenditure, the have-nots need a stable, continuous organization -- a political party dedicated to lower-class interests. The impossibility of preserving such an organization in the one-party 20th century South, he judged, explained the deplorable lack of public services for the lower strata. Complicating and undercutting this line of argument, however, Key went on to point out that the party struggle in western democracies has always been a battle between two or more sets of elites bidding for the favor of the electorate. The disorganized auctions between constantly shifting bidders in a politics of faction, rather than party led to a great deal of impulse buying; and once purchased, the goods were often not delivered.

It seems to me that these two arguments of Key's are at best muddled and at worst contradictory, and that they have bred a great deal of confusion in the subsequent literature. The first sees the have-nots achieving their class aims through a single lower-class dominated party -- a socialist or quasi-socialist party. Competition from another party is necessary chiefly so that the aims of the class party don't get diluted. It is the presence of a class party, not the presence of party competition, that is most crucial. Since there are always more have-nots than haves, the lower-class party will often achieve its aims. The second argument, on the other hand, focuses purely on competition and views voters as calculating decision-makers who merely sell their votes to whichever opportunistic elite offers the more appealing package of public services. This second, bargaining model, is, as William Riker and his students have recently shown,

much less deterministic in its predictions. In the bargaining model, in other words, party competition may lead to either a reduction or an increase in the levels of public services. Wealth may be redistributed from the top to the bottom, from the bottom to the top, or not at all.[9] Although he put less stress on it than on the party competition point, Key also clearly believed that the less members of the lower-class voted, other things being equal, the lower the level of public services for them would be. Operationally, he assumed that non-lower-class voters always voted in constant proportions and that the overall turnout level was therefore purely a function of lower-class turnout.

Subsequent work in political science has not done much to clarify Key's confusion on the party competition point.[10] In their attempts to test Key's assertions by using them to try to explain differences in the levels of public expenditures across American cities and states, and, more recently, across countries, political scientists have made two crucial, and, I think, incorrect assumptions. First, they assumed that if they could show that differences in party competition across geographical units were not positively associated with higher levels of public services, then they had proved that party competition had no effect. This is simply a nonsequitur. If the "class party" version of the party competition argument is to be tested, the relevant independent variable is a necessarily subjective qualitative judgment about the presence or absence of a class-dominated party. On the other hand, the bargaining model, in the present stage of political theory, leads to no firm predictions about public expenditure levels at all. Neither variant can be tested by simply throwing an interval-level party competition index into the right-hand side of a regression equation. The second incorrect assumption made by many of the political scientists is that public service <u>levels</u> were adequate proxies for the <u>distribution</u> of public services. But the fact that the level of spending for highways or education was higher in one state

than another does not imply that the services in the former state redistributed wealth more than those in the latter. Recognizing this difficulty, a few political scientists have attempted, unsuccessfully, I believe, to confront it by estimating the redistributive impact of certain public services. Others have simply begun to add another qualification to their generalizations.[10]

Drawing on the scholarly works reviewed, statements of turn-of the century educators, and my own previous work in Southern politics during this era, let me lay out four rather informal models for examination. I will refer to them, in turn, as

1. the Progressive model;
2. the Progressivism-for-whites-only, or, for short, the "whites only" model;
3. the Progressivism-for-middle-class-whites-only or "middle-class" model;

and, 4. the economic determinist model.

Each will be tested against data for the state as a whole and for each county collected from the series of North Carolina State Superintendent and State Auditors' reports for each five year interval from 1880 to 1910 -- that is, for 1880, 1885, 1890, and so on. I will also include data on each gubernatorial election held during the period. A great many of the figures in this massive data set -- it contains roughly 60,000 pieces of information -- are separated by race, and figures not separated by race can often easily be estimated.

To return to the models, the first, the Progressive model, is elitist. Educational progress came only when elites pushed the recalcitrant masses to increase school taxes. The degree of success of such campaigns was contingent upon the degree of prosperity. As one of the foremost educational reformers, Charles W. Dabney, put it, ". . . the poverty of the people is the immediate cause why the schools are so poor. . . . Where education is needed most is just

where the people do not appreciate it and will not exert themselves to provide it. It is not to be expected that a poor people will tax themselves for schools. . . ." Fortunately for the poor, the leaders were benevolent, and the increased benefits were distributed in an increasingly equitable fashion, for blacks as well as whites. As Heatwole, speaking of Virginia, asserted, the Progressive Era was one of "educational progress remarkable, if not phenomenal, in the line of democratizing education. . . ." And with regard to North Carolina, Knight asserted that Governor Charles B. Aycock believed in " 'educating everybody and educating everything.' This creed made him the Negro's best and most active educational advocate."[13] We may derive four predictions from the Progressive version of educational history:

1. Before the onset of the educational campaign, local school tax rates should have been lower in poor counties than in rich counties.

2. Increases in wealth shoud have been strongly and positively associated with increases in educational expenditures.

3 & 4. Educational expenditures should have been more equitably distributed among whites, and among both blacks and whites after 1900 than before.

The "Progressivism for whites only" model, derived primarily from Bond, Harlan, and Key, clashes with the Progressive description of events at nearly every point.. According to Bond, blacks and poor whites believed education crucial to improving their social and economic status, and showed, especially during Reconstruction, that they were willing to sacrifice a good deal for it. The decline of black political power, however, reduced that group's ability to demand educational equality.[14] The marks of the decrease in Afro-American political power were the withering away of black voting and the waning of the political party to which they chiefly adhered in the 19th century, the GOP. Since poor whites, according to this theory, were not

disfranchised, they could secure a relatively fair share in the Progressive Era increases in educational expenditures.[15] The "whites only" argument, then, yields four propositions:

1. Even before the Progressive Era, tax rates should have been higher in the poorer than in richer areas.

2. Educational expenditures for blacks should have declined, relative to those for whites, after blacks were disfranchised and Republican party fortunes ebbed.

3. The relative black declines should have been directly related to declines in black turnout and in Republican strength.

4. The distribution of white educational expenditures should have remained roughly constant over the whole period from 1880 to 1910.[16]

The "Progressivism for middle class whites only" hypothesis has two variants: the first, Bond's and Harlan's; the second, growing out of Key's work, my own. Bond asserted that laws allowing black belt whites to divert state school funds from the education of black to the education of white children, coupled with the growth in state educational allocations and with restrictions on local taxation, led to an increasing inequality in per capita expenditures among whites. The black belt gained at the expense of the white counties. While agreeing with Bond and Harlan on that point, I would also expect that declines in white turnout and in the strength of lower-class-oriented political parties led to additional inequities among whites. As I have argued in my recent book, upper-class Democrats from black-majority areas instituted changes in the political structure in the turn-of-the-century South in order to disfranchise many poor whites as well as almost all blacks, and to discourage political parties responsive to either group. A decline in lower class white political power, like the decline in black power, should have led to a decline in the public

services that class received. The "middle class" argument leads, therefore, to two separate propositions:

1. Bond and Harlan would argue that white educational expenditures per white child should have been strongly related to the percentage of Negroes in a county only after the legal changes encouraged racial discrimination in black belt areas.

2. I would hypothesize, in addition, that changes in white expenditure levels should have been associated with changes in white turnout as well as in the party fortunes of the two North Carolina parties most responsive to lower class white voters, the Populists and Republicans.

Finally, the socioeconomic determinist model serves as a general null hypothesis to each of the other theories. Since its proponents assume, in effect, that the taste for taxes and service levels is a function only of other socioeconomic variables, we should expect to find, first, that tax rates were roughly constant everywhere. Second, expenditure levels should have been correlated highly with wealth, and changes in each should aslo have been strongly related. Third, any changes in the distribution of expenditures by race across counties should reflect only changes in the underlying socioeconomic structure. To the determinist, laws simply mirror the currently existing social structure rather than themselves producing immediate social change. Consequently, the legal alterations which Bond and Harlan believed led to discrimination in educational expenditures in favor of black belt whites should have had no effect. The fourth prediction of the determinist model is, therefore, that the relation between expenditure levels and the percentage of Negroes in each county should have remained roughly constant over time.

Let us turn now from expositing the models to examining the data. The Progressive contention that the denizens of poor areas were less anxious for an education than their wealthier counterparts appears

to be wrong. Pearsonian correlation coefficients between wealth per adult male and the percentages of wealth paid in taxes on property and polls in each county can be computed for 1880, 1890, and 1905 for North Carolina. For 1880, long before the educational campaign, and for 1905, during the campaign, the correlations between wealth per adult male and the tax rate by county were slightly negative, but not significantly different from zero at the .05 level. The 1890 correlations are much more interesting, since for that date the state published both wealth and taxes paid separately for each race. In 1890, the correlation between white wealth per white adult male and the white tax rate by county was -.625, and the analogous coefficient for blacks was -.653.[17] The tax statistics, in sum, not only tend to refute the elitist argument, they also cast doubt on the determinist contention that the taste for education and taxes was everywhere constant.

The regressivity of the tax structure should astonish few. But how inequitably distributed was the quality of education those taxes bought? Unfortunately, this question poses two severe difficulties: how to measure quality, and how to measure maldistribution. For the first, I have chosen to concentrate on expenditures for teachers' salaries, and, for the years from 1880 to 1910, for schoolhouses and sites.[18] No other figures provide a full series of quality-related measures which are comparable across counties.[19] I chose to divide these expenditures by the number of children in each race between 6 and 21 given in the school censuses, rather than by the enrollment or average daily attendance because the rates of enrollment and attendance were undoubtedly somewhat dependent upon the quality of the education offered by the schools. Before the passage of compulsory attendance laws, the worse the schools, the less likely one would have been to enroll one's child, and the less likely that child would have been to attend. Normalizing expenditures by enrollment or attendance would, consequently, compound the difficulty of interpreting

the dependent variable. To measure the degree of racial discrimination by county, I simply formed the ratio of the expenditure divided by population for each race. The higher what I shall call the "racial discrimination ratio," the better treated blacks were, relative to whites.[20]

The statewide trends in expenditure per child for blacks, whites, and the ratio between them given in Table 1 are clear enough. Whites and blacks shared poverty relatively equally until 1900, after which the white increases far outdistanced those for Negroes. The variations between counties were not so stable, however, as the columns listing the coefficients of variability indicate. School monies were sometimes distributed fairly evenly from county to county, as in 1900, but sometimes much less evenly, as in 1890. The statewide figures may, therefore, mask developments at the local level.

Tables 2 and 3 indicate trends in the economic and political variables. Wealth per white adult male -- and the rates and methods of assessing that wealth -- were pretty constant from 1880 to 1900, after which assessed wealth, along with expenditures for white children, mushroomed. This makes a prima faciae case for economic determinism. Changes in the political figures, indicated in Table 3, trace a somewhat more subtle pattern. White turnout was very high through 1900, after which it slumped off by fifteen to twenty percent. Black turnout percentages were quite comparable to white in some elections, and lower, though still approximately two thirds of the eligibles, through 1896. The 1900 figure is very suspect because of quite extensive ballot box stuffing, but I estimate that almost no Negroes voted in North after 1900. The disfranchisement of blacks and the mortal wounds administered to the Populist and Republican parties came at the same time as the increase in discrimination against blacks in the distribution of educational funds. Any changes in the distribution of expenditures among whites might be accounted for by the trends in white turnout

and the decline of parties responsive to the white lower class. That Tables 2 and 3 make cases for economic determinism on the one hand and political determinism on the other implies that we must move down to the county level to reach more definite conclusions.

Table 4 summarizes seven linear regression equations in which the dependent variable for each county was the expenditure per child for whites and the independent variables were white wealth per adult male, the percentage Negro, and estimated white turnout.[21] Looking at the equations as a whole, we find them quite good predictors, usually explaining nearly half of the variance in the dependent variable. The F tests show that all the equations predict better than chance at the .05 level. Examining the individual coefficients, we notice first that wealth was always significantly related to expenditure. Before conceding the game to the determinists, however, let us consider the pattern of relationships in the third column. If the percentage of Negroes in each county were related to educational expenditures merely because it was an indicator of a social structure which was more hierarchical in heavily-Negro areas, more democratic in the mountains, then one would expect the coefficients to remain pretty much the same. If, however, one considers the Bond-Harlan argument that black belt whites could prosper by discriminating against Negroes only when the laws allowed them to, and that those laws could only be passed after black political power diminished, one would predict almost exactly the pattern which column three of Table 4 presents: the coefficient is first significantly negative, then insignificant and finally strongly positive. The percentage Negro ought therefore to be considered not a socioeconomic variable at all, but a proxy for statewide political trends.[22] The fourth column lends little support to the argument that politicians penalized disfranchised whites by disregarding them in the allocation of public expenditures. Only two of the coefficients are significant, and they both have the wrong sign.

Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of seven regression analogous to those in Table 4, but this time using the expenditure per black child and the racial discrimination ratio as dependent variables and deleting coefficients not significantly different from zero.[23] In general, these equations are poorer predictors than the regressions for whites, having significant explanatory power in only half of the fourteen possible cases. The pattern of the racial discrimination ratios, however, was almost exactly what the "Progressivism for whites only" model predicted. Before 1900, there was no more discrimination in the allocation of funds against Negroes in the black areas than anywhere else. After 1900, racial discrimination increased directly with the percentage of Negroes in each county (a higher "R. D. R." signifies less discrimination). Note, also, the two significant coefficients in column three. The revitalized Republicans and the Populists apparently rewarded their black constituents in 1895 with more a equitable distribution of funds. Had these two anti-racist parties been able to maintain their 1895 strength, instead of being overthrown in the vicious 1898 "white supremacy campaign" and devastated by the subsequent disfranchisement laws, the tremendous growth in racial discrimination during the Progressive Era might have been avoided. The 1910 coefficient reflects the fact that the Democrats discriminated against blacks considerably more than did the party of Lincoln, even allowing for variations in wealth and the percentage Negro in each county.[24]

While superior to a simple presentation of statewide averages, the variations in expenditure per child by county do not represent quite adequately the change in patterns of distribution of expenditures. What we need are measures which summarize statewide trends in distribution without ignoring the county-by-county differences. Table 7 is based on a series of Lorentz inequality curves, that is, curves which plot the cumulative percentage of expenditures on the abscissa

and the cumulative percentage of population on the ordinate of a coordinate system. If expenditures were distributed equally to everyone, one percent of the population would get one percent of the expenditures, two percent would get two percent, etc., in which case the points would all fall on a line drawn at a 45 degree angle to each axis. The Lorentz curve tracing the actual cumulative percentages is a measure of the deviation from the equality of the 45 degree line, and the Gini coefficient given in column 1 of Table 7 is proportional to the area between the Lorentz curve and the 45 degree line. The higher the Gini coefficient, which varies from zero to one, the greater the inequality. The other four columns in the Table give selected points on the Lorentz curve, and have more natural interpretations than the Gini. If one ranks all counties by white expenditure per child, the lowest third of the counties got about 22% of the expenditures in 1880, the bottom half got 37%, and so on.

The particular figures show that the inequality of expenditures for whites reached a minimum in 1895, after which it increased significantly. The distribution for the whole population was almost exactly the same as the distribution for whites alone through 1900, which indicates that there was little purely racial discrimination up to that time. After 1900, inequality for the whole population increased more than inequality for whites alone, reflecting the greater degree of racial discrimination after the turn of the century.

But what relation did this growing inequality in expenditures bear to the economic structure? It is not inconsistent with the pattern of Lorentz curves that the expenditures could have been distributed less equally after 1900, but that the distribution increasingly favored the poor at the expense of the rich. That the figures do reflect growing class as well as racial inequality is proved graphically in Figures 1 and 2. The numbers which the free-hand curves in Figure 2, for example, sketch were generated by first ranking every county by white

wealth per white male adult and then cumulating the percentages of wealth held by whites from the poorest up to the richest county. then cumulated the percentages of educational expenditures on whites for each county, rank-ordered by per capita wealth, and plotted the two cumulative percentages against each other. If expenditures were distributed exactly in proportion to wealth, the curves would all coincide with a 45 degree line. But they do not. Expenditures for education were much more equally distributed than wealth, even after 1900. As Figure 1 strikingly demonstrates, however, there was a massive shift in distribution between 1895 and 1910. In the earlier year, blacks, who held but 3.2% of total wealth, got 35.3% of the expenditures. The blacks and poor whites who held 40% of the wealth got 53% of the expenditures. By 1910, however, there had been a large shift in expenditures away from the poor. Blacks in 1910 got only 16.7% of the expenditures, less than half of their 1895 expenditures. The bottom 40% of blacks and whites received about 48% of the total, or about 5% less than they had during the era of the Populist-Republican Fusion government. That this reflected not only racial discrimination, but class differentials among whites is demonstrated by Figure 2. Movement from the middle line, based on 1895 data for white wealth and white expenditures per child, to the bottom line, based on 1910 figures, reflects a growing bias against the poor whites in the distribution of benefits, although less of a gulf than between whites and blacks.

The burgeoning expenditures of the Progressive Era, then, were inequitably distributed -- biased against poor whites, and even more biased against the blacks. Unable to protect themselves at the polls, robbed of the shelter provided by sympathetic political parties, and incapable, therefore, of prevailing upon the legislature to repeal laws which favored the wealthy whites in the black belt counties at the expense of both Negroes and poor hill country whites, the lower-class

could only watch helplessly as they fell educationally further and further behind the middle and upper class whites who supported, and benefited most from, the so-called Progressive movement.



FIGURE 1: Cumulative Percent of Wealth on Horizontal Axis, Cumulative Percent of Expenditures

(Blacks and Whites Separated) on the Vertical Axis, Both Ordered by Increasing Wealth Per Male Adult



FIGURE 2: Cumulative Percent of Wealth on Horizontal Axis, Cumulative Percent of Expenditures

(Whites Only) on the Vertical Axis, Both Ordered by Increasing Wealth Per White Male Adult

TABLE 1: STATEWIDE STATISTICS ON EDUCATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

Year	Expenditure/Population			Coefficient of Variability*		
	White	Black	RDR	White	Black	RDR
1880	$0.72	$0.74	1.03	0.37	0.37	0.40
1885	1.07	1.12	1.05	0.36	0.65	0.72
1890	1.13	0.97	0.86	0.65	0.70	0.80
1895	1.21	1.06	0.88	0.32	0.32	2.35
1900	1.48	1.06	0.72	0.38	0.31	0.37
1905	2.21	1.24	0.56	0.34	0.38	0.54
1910	3.26	1.39	0.43	0.45	0.44	0.67

* Coefficient of Variability = standard deviation/mean, measured for all counties

TABLE 2: COUNTY MEANS: ASSESSED WEALTH AND ESTIMATES OF WEALTH IN NORTH CAROLINA

Year	White Wealth Per Adult Male	Black Wealth Per Adult Male
1880	$779.18*	
1885	873.30*	
1890	860.48 (851.04*)	$ 51.85
1895	813.02 (814.20*)	59.78
1900	883.08 (884.46*)	108.22
1905	1215.59*	
1910	1938.37*	

*Asterisked figures are estimates; all others are actually separated by race in the original published data. The estimates were calculated by assuming that black adult males all held the same amount of wealth in each year -- $50 in 1880, $75 in 1885 and 1890, $100 in 1895 and 1900, $125 in 1905 and 1910. The correlations across counties between the estimates for whites and the actual published figures for whites in 1890 1895, and 1900 were .960, .997, and .998, and the regression coefficients (b's) were all close to 1.0.

TABLE 3: TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

Year	% Democratic	% Republican[A]	% Other[A]	Estimated Turnout[B]	
				White	Black
1880	41.3	39.2	0	76	86
1884	45.6	39.2	0	79	98
1888	44.6	40.2	0.9	95	68
1892	37.9	26.5	14.1	94	64
1896	37.5	39.7	8.3	85	87
1900	44.8	30.3	0.1	80	60
1904	28.5	17.6	0.1	63	0
1908	29.8	22.4	0.1	68	0

A -- of total adult males

B -- for methods of estimation, please consult The Shaping of Southern Politics.

TABLE 4: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR WHITE EXPENDITURE/POPULATION

Year	Constant	Coefficients for White Wealth	Coefficients for % Negro	Estimated White Turnout	R^2	F
1880	+.426	+.00065*	-.598*	-.003	.471	19.02
1885	+.806	+.00041*	-.035	-.019	.154	4.44
1890	+.429	+.00137*	-.042	-.472	.377	16.35
1895	+.375	+.00060*	+.787*	+.141	.571	28.41
1900	+.880	+.00037*	1.407*	-.088	.459	22.93
1905	+1.546	+.00088*	+.626	-.987*	.561	35.33
1910	+4.180	+.00088*	+1.760*	-4.253*	.490	26.95

* Significant at .05 level

TABLE 5: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR BLACK EXPENDITURE PER CHILD

(Significant Coefficients Only)

Year	Total Wealth per Adult Male	% Negro	R^2	F
1880	+ .00052	- .771	.285	6.278
1905	+ .00060	- 2.153	.283	8.089
1910		- 3.990	.212	5.567

TABLE 6: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION RATIO

(Significant Coefficients Only)

Year	White Wealth Per White Male Adult	% Negro	% Anti-Democratic	% Not Voting	R^2	F
1885	- .00070				.079	1.539
1895			+ .329		.180	3.458
1900		- .679		+ .202	.364	11.426
1905		- .960			.432	15.579
1910		-1.682	+ .264		.478	19.000

TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES PER CHILD

Year	Gini Coefficient	Cumulative % of Expenditures on Cumulative % of Population			
		1/3	1/2	3/4	9/10
		a. Whites			
1880	.19	.22	.37	.66	.82
1885	.18	.21	.36	.63	.83
1890	.20	.22	.37	.61	.79
1895	.15	.24	.39	.65	.85
1900	.18	.23	.38	.64	.82
1905	.18	.23	.37	.63	.83
1910	.21	.21	.36	.62	.81
		b. Blacks & Whites			
1880	.18	.22	.37	.64	.83
1885	.20	.20	.35	.61	.79
1890	.20	.22	.37	.62	.81
1895	.15	.24	.39	.65	.85
1900	.18	.23	.38	.63	.82
1905	.21	.21	.35	.62	.82
1910	.27	.17	.30	.58	.79

FOOTNOTES

1. Charles W. Dabney, Universal Education in the South, 2 vols. (reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969), vol. I, p. vii-ix; Louis R. Harlan, Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915 (reprint ed., New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 269.

2. For such a claim, see Charles B. Aycock's inaugural address, quoted in Edgar W. Knight, Public School Education in North Carolina (reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 329.

3. Dabney, "The Public School Problem in the South," in William Torrey Harris, Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year 1900-1901 (Washington: G. P. O., 1902, vol. II, p. 1018; Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 307.

4. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), conveniently summarizes Dye's point of view and much of his earlier research.

5. See Edgar W. Knight, Public School Education in North Carolina (reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969, as well as the previously cited works of Dabney and Harlan.

6. Edgar W. Knight, "Some Economic, Political, and Social Influences on Education in the South," in W. Carson King et al., Secondary Education in the South (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 3-19; Knight, Education in North Carolina, pp. 294-328; Cornelius J. Heatwole, A History of Education in Virginia (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), pp. 217-365; J. L. Blair Buck, The Development of Public Schools in Virginia, 1607-1952 (Richmond: State Board of Education, vol. XXXV, No. 1, July, 1952), pp. 27-273; Dorothy Orr, A History of Education in Georgia (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), pp. 181-343.

7. Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order (reprint ed., New York: Octagon Press, 1966); Harlan, Separate and Unequal.

8. Key, Southern Politics, pp. 298-311.

9. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), Chapter 9, pp. 240-271.

10. There is much too much literature on this topic for me to list here even a full bibliography of review articles. The best reviews is Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies: A Review of Comparative Input-Output Analyses," Political Science Annual, 3 (1972), pp. 3-72.

11. Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), pp. 508-522. I do not mean to cavil at their attempt. I merely think their index inadequate and their methodology flawed.

12. Dabney, in Harris, Report, pp. 1019-1020, 1013.

13. Heatwole, Education in Virginia, p. 321, and Paul Monroe's introduction to Heatwole's book, pp. xiii-xiv; Knight, Education in North Carolina, p. 342.

14. Bond, Education of the Negro, pp. 76-7, 92. Bond, Key, and Harlan all viewed that decline as a gradual one, accounted for by extra-legal disfranchisement and pretty much accomplished by about the early 1890s. Since, as I have shown in The Shaping of Southern Politics, ch. 7, North Carolina blacks continued to vote in very large numbers until legally disfranchised in 1900, I will discard their factual premise while at the same time accepting their more fundamental argument linking the political power of a group with the public services it can obtain.

15. Harlan, Separate and Unequal, p. 265.

16. These and other propositions may be reworked in the future to include both the taxing and spending sides of school programs. The proper dependent variable ought to be a ratio of or difference between the costs of and some crude measure of the benefits from education. But there are many difficult theoretical dilemmas to be faced in constructing the index: Should it be a ratio or a difference? How should wages foregone to get an education be estimated? How should potential returns to alternative uses of capital be taken into account? In addition, there is the grave practical problem that tax rates are seldom available by race, while those we do have by race (for Georgia and Virginia, for example) show both striking racial inequality in tax rates and disturbingly large differences in the degree of inequality for successive years. In sum, the usual problems of

testing human capital theories are compounded in this case, and I have not yet been able to work through all the difficulties.

17. The correlation between the two was +.627. The correlations between the white and black tax rates and the tax rate for people of both races were +.915 and +.595, respectively. The regressiveness of the tax structure does not merely reflect black belt/white county differences. If one controls for the percentage Negro in each county, the partial correlation between white wealth per white adult male and t white tax rate is reduced only to -.566, while the analogous statistic for blacks is -.633. I divided wealth by the number of adult males by race in order to approximate the wealth for each family, since the number of family heads in each county was unavailable in the censuses.

18. The fact that no statistics on spending for capital outlay separated by race are available for 1905 and 1910 undoubtedly biased downward my estimates of the degree of racial and perhaps of class discrimination for those two years, for the state was in the midst of a mammoth boom in school construction, especially for whites. The average values of white and black schoolhouses in 1900 were $181 and $122, respectively; in 1910, they were $973 and $297.

19. Pointing out that there was no one-to-one relationship for the American states in the 1960s between expenditure levels and such measures of public service quality as the percent failing the selective service examination in each state, the political scientist Ira Sharkansky urged students of policy outputs to employ actual service levels rather than indices based on expenditures as the dependent variables in their equations. One problem in the present case is that for the South in this period, there are no reliable state-or-region-wide measures of quality. Another difficulty is that even where measures of service outputs, such as the percentage of illiteracy, are available, they are certainly independently related to socio-economic variables. For instance, one would expect to find a high correlation between illiteracy and wealth whatever the impact of public education was in reducing illiteracy, because wealthier communities would be able to provide more educational activities outside of formal schooling. Ira Sharkansky, "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), pp. 1066-1077; Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 176-198.

20. I have left a discussion of a great many other statistics out of this paper, partly for the sake of clarity, and partly for lack of time to perform an extensive enough analysis of them. Two other leading candidates for measures of educational quality, the "grades" of teachers and various pupil/teacher ratios, performed poorly. The standards for classifying teachers as "first grade," "second grade," and so on appear to have varied widely from county to county. The ubiquitous calls in the contemporary educational reports for consolidation of school districts are reflected in the statistics. Tiny, but poverty-striken districts often had smaller ratios of the number of school children, the enrollment, or the average daily attendance to each teacher than larger, wealthier districts. To employ the teacher/student ratio as a dependent variable would therefore be tantamount to asserting that a barely literate part-time schoolkeeper offered his handful of pupils a better education in a shack up in a hollow than a superior teacher who taught a larger class in a town.

21. White turnout was estimated on the assumption that Negroes in every county voted in the same proportion as they were estimated to have in the state as a whole.

22. The percentage Negro apparently does not reflect county by county political trends, for the relationship between it and expenditures per white child does not wash out if several other political variables are introduced into the regression equations.

23. There were four independent variables in each equation: total wealth per male adult, the percent Negro, the percent of all adult males voting against the Democrats, and the overall percentage not voting. The last variable is an unsatisfactory proxy for Negro turnout, which can only be estimated at the state level. The operationalization is based, in effect, on the assumption that white turnout was constant across all counties and that variations in turnout were due entirely to differences in black voting rates from county to county. The significant coefficient on turnout for 1900 in Table 6 has a sign opposite to that predicted. The independent variable in this case, however, was the percent not voting in 1896, when black turnout levels were high. I used that figure on the assumption that there would have been some log between the Democratic return to power in 1898 and the onset of discrimination, but it appears that there was no log. I shall therefore recalculate the equation, substituting the 1900 nonvoting figure.

24. The results of thirty-six regressions using as dependent variables the changes in expenditure per child for whites, blacks, and the racial discrimination ratio between them, and the proportionate

changes (the changes divided by the earlier levels) in each of these will not be reported here. The independent variables were the percent Negro in the earlier year and the changes and proportionate changes in wealth, estimated white and overall turnout, and the percent voting against the Democrats. The few significant coefficients formed patterns similar to those shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6.